Virginia Beach Police (Virginia) Shoulder Patch from 1993

Virginia Beach Police Virginia Shoulder Patch New from 1993 This item is sold as a collectable only it does not convey any authority of any kind Worldwide Shipping on an actual cost basis Sales of this item are in full compliance with United States Federal Law: 18 USC § 716 et seq: (a) Whoever— (1) knowingly transfers, transports, or receives, in interstate or foreign commerce, a counterfeit official insignia or uniform; (2) knowingly transfers, in interstate or foreign commerce, a genuine official insignia or uniform to an individual, knowing that such individual is not authorized to possess it under the law of the place in which the badge is the official official insignia or uniform; (3) knowingly receives a genuine official insignia or uniform in a transfer prohibited by paragraph (2); or (4) being a person not authorized to possess a genuine official insignia or uniform under the law of the place in which the badge is the official insignia or uniform, knowingly transports that badge in interstate or foreign commerce, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 6 months, or both. (b) It is a defense to a prosecution under this section that the insignia or uniform is other than a counterfeit insignia or uniform and is not used to mislead or deceive, or is used or is intended to be used exclusively— (1) as a memento, or in a collection or exhibit; (2) for decorative purposes; (3) for a dramatic presentation, such as a theatrical, film, or television production; or (4) for any other recreational purpose. (c) As used in this section— (1) the term “genuine police badge” means an official badge issued by public authority to identify an individual as a law enforcement officer having police powers; (2) the term “counterfeit police badge” means an item that so resembles a police badge that it would deceive an ordinary individual into believing it was a genuine police badge; and (3) the term “official insignia or uniform” means an article of distinctive clothing or insignia, including a badge, emblem or identification card, that is an indicium of the authority of a public employee; (4) the term “public employee” means any officer or employee of the Federal Government or of a State or local government; and (5) the term “uniform” means distinctive clothing or other items of dress, whether real or counterfeit, worn during the performance of official duties and which identifies the wearer as a public agency employee. (d) It is a defense to a prosecution under this section that the official insignia or uniform is not used or intended to be used to mislead or deceive, or is a counterfeit insignia or uniform and is used or is intended to be used exclusively— (1) for a dramatic presentation, such as a theatrical, film, or television production; or (2) for legitimate law enforcement purposes. A. The Use of Another’s Trademark In A Descriptive Sense It is a basic principle marking an outer boundary of the trademark monopoly that, while trademark rights may be acquired in a word, symbol or device, acquisition of those rights does not prevent others from using the word, symbol or devise in good faith in its descriptive sense, and not as a trademark. “This principle is of great importance because it protects the right of society at large to use words or images in their primary descriptive sense, as against the claims of a trademark owner to exclusivity.” Car-Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 1995) ; see Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Sanders, 331 U.S. 125 (1947) (registering proper noun as trademark does not withdraw it from language, nor reduce it to exclusive possession of registrant). To come within this fair use defense a person must make use of the other party’s trademark (i) other than as a mark, (ii) in a descriptive sense, and (iii) in good faith. See 15 U.S.C. §1115(b)(4) . B. Reference to the Owner of the Mark or the Owner’s Goods or Services Another species of the fair use defense is the use of a mark when referring to the owner of a mark or the owner’s goods or services. Once again, this defense is only available if the unauthorized user is not using the term for purposes of source identification and the use does not imply sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark owner. Obviously, a great deal of useful social and commercial dialogue would be all but impossible if speakers were under threat of an infringement lawsuit every time they made reference to a person, company or product by using its trademarks. In New Kids on the Block v. North American Pub., Inc., 971 F2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992), the Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendant newspapers which had used the trademarked name of the band “New Kids on the Block” to refer to the band in polls it conducted for the purpose of stimulating newspaper sales. The Court referred to a “class of cases where the use of the trademark does not attempt to capitalize on consumer confusion or to appropriate the cachet of one product for a different one,” noting that “[s]uch nominative use of a mark – where the only word reasonably available to describe a particular thing is pressed into service – lies outside the strictures of trademark law: The Ninth Circuit stated that a commercial user is entitled to a nominative fair use defense if the user meets the following three requirements: (i) the product or service in issue must not be readily identifiable without reference to the mark; (ii) only so much of the mark may be used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; and (iii) the user must not do anything to imply sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark owner. New Kids on the Block, 971 F2d at 308 . C. The First Sale Doctrine The unauthorized use of another’s trademark is also permitted under the “first sale” doctrine. Under this doctrine a business that resells genuine, non-adulterated goods bearing a true mark cannot be held liable for trademark infringement, even if the distributor had no authority to do so from the actual trademark owner. See Polymer Technology Corp. v. Mimran, 975 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1992) . “After the first sale, the brandholder’s control is deemed exhausted [and d]own-the-line retailers are free to display and advertise the branded goods. Secondhand dealers may advertise the branded merchandise for resale in competition with the sales of the markholder . . . .” Osawa & Co. v. B&H Photo, 589 F.Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) .